INTRODUCTION
President Barack Obama has asked Senator John Kerry, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to move forward on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 2 ("CEDAW" or the "Women's Convention"), 3 which President Jimmy Carter signed in 1978.4 This Article focuses on the consequences of ratification for reproductive rights. Under CEDAW, I argue, the United States would be required to fully assure these rights, including subsidized family planning services and abortion.
Part I of this Article describes CEDAW's broad prohibition against what I call 'the reproduction of gender,' including the "sexual division of labor based on biological differences" that historian Gerda Lerner 5 and other feminist
Reproductive rights are of similarly recent vintage in international law. The basic concept first appeared in 1968, in the final document approved by the Teheran Conference on Human Rights in 1968:20 "[T]he rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have the access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights." 21 But it was not until the World Conference on Population in 1994 ("Cairo Conference") that reproductive rights were clearly articulated.22 Although convened to address population issues, the participants in the Cairo Conference recognized that: (1) family-planning programs should not involve any form of coercion, (2) government-sponsored economic incentives and disincentives were only marginally effective, and (3) governmental goals "should be defined in terms of unmet needs for information and services," rather than quotas or targets imposed on service providers. 23 The aim "should be to assist couples and individuals to achieve their reproductive goals and give them the full opportunity to exercise the right to have children by choice." 24 The
Cairo Conference required states to meet the family planning needs of their populations as soon as possible, but no later than 2015. 25 The Cairo Conference recognized that reproductive rights include both "the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children, and to have the information and means to do so" and Whether CEDAW includes a right to assisted conception, or whether surrogacy perpetuates gender stereotypes, for example, is beyond the scope of this Article. See "the right to obtain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health." 26 This somewhat awkward formulation reflects the participating states' disparate approaches to reproductive rights as well as the failure of many states to address these rights at all. 27 The idea that women should have control over the number and spacing of their children remains controversial, especially in cultures where large families are viewed as desirable. 28 Nevertheless, reproductive rights are increasingly recognized in international human rights law. 29 These rights, including education about family planning and access to contraception, are now widely recognized throughout the world, often in connection with the right to health, a right which is not recognized in U.S. law. 30 Almost every state allows access to contraception, and several states provide contraceptives as a free public health benefit.
3 '
Most states have not, however, fully assured women's reproductive rights. 32 This would require them to "respect" these rights, that is, to refrain from violating them; to "protect" them, that is, to assure that no third party 26. Id. 1 7.3. These goals were reiterated at the United Nations, Fourth World Conference on Women. As set out in the Beijing Platform: "The human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence." U.N. FOURTH WORLD
CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, THE BEIJING DECLARATION AND PLATFORM FOR ACTION, 1 96 (1995).
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(describing the absence of reproductive rights in Lebanon). In 2005, the U.N. Human Rights Committee decided its first abortion case, which dealt with a seventeen-year-old Peruvian girl who'd been forced to carry an anencephalic fetus-one missing most of its forebrain-to term, despite the fact that it had no chance of surviving more than a few days outside the womb. The committee ruled that Peru had 'an obligation to take steps to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future.' restricts them; and to "fulfill" them, that is, to proactively assure their realization. 33 Traditional human rights discourse, as set out in the International Bill of Rights, 3 " and even the provisions of the Women's Convention which directly address reproductive rights, 35 allow states to fall short. Rather, it is CEDAW's prohibition against the reproduction of gender which compels these rights, as explained below.
RUTH DIXON-MUELLER, POPULATION POLICIES AND
B. The Women's Convention 1. Beyond Non-Discrimination CEDAW explicitly guarantees women's human rights, including their rights to participate in social, economic, cultural and political life on equal terms with men. These rights include the civil and political rights familiar to Americans from our own Constitution, such as the right to vote 3 6 and freedom of movement.
3 7 These rights also include less familiar economic and social rights, such as the right to work 38 and the right to health. 39 Thus, CEDAW assures positive as well as negative rights, imposing obligations on the state. Under CEDAW, moreover, rights are to be assured in fact as well as in law. That is, CEDAW goes beyond formal equality (equality of opportunity) to require outcome equality. 40 There is no required showing of discriminatory intent. Under CEDAW, "discrimination" is genuinely robust:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "discrimination against women" shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis 33. The Committee explains the requirements to "respect, protect and fulfil" rights in the context of reproductive rights specifically:
14. The obligation to respect rights requires States parties to refrain from obstructing action taken by women in pursuit of their health goals.. .. For example, States parties should not restrict women's access to health services or to the clinics that provide those services on the ground that women do not have the authorization of husbands, partners, parents or health authorities, because they are unmarried or because they are women. . . . 15. The obligation to protect rights . . . requires States parties . . . to prevent and impose sanctions for violations of rights by private persons and organizations.. . . 17. The duty tofulfil rights places an obligation on States parties to take appropriate legislative, judicial, administrative, budgetary, economic and other measures to the maximum extent of their available resources to ensure that women realize their rights to health care. Studies such as those which emphasize the high maternal mortality and morbidity rates worldwide and the large numbers of couples who would like to limit their family size but lack access to or do not use any form of contraception provide an important indication for States parties of possible breaches of their duties to ensure women's access to health care. Under Article 2, furthermore, "States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms" and "agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women."
CEDAW
42
Article 4 specifically provides for affirmative action "aimed at accelerating de facto equality."
43 CEDAW, in short, requires the state to assure actual equality between women and men, sooner rather than later. As explained below, this is just the beginning.
2. The Sexual Division of Labor As anthropologist Gayle Rubin notes, the sexual division of labor based on biological differences appears in "endless variety and monotonous similarity, cross-culturally and throughout history.""' As Rubin explains:
Although every society has some sort of division of tasks by sex, the assignment of any particular task to one sex or the other varies enormously ... [the purpose] is to insure the union of men and women by making the smallest viable economic unit contain at least one man and one woman. The division of labor by sex can therefore be seen as a 'taboo': a taboo against the sameness of men and women, a taboo dividing the sexes into two mutually exclusive categories, a taboo which exacerbates the biological differences between the sexes and thereby creates gender. 45 The innumerable iterations of the sexual division of labor are often grounded in stereotypes of women as reproductive workers and men as productive workers. This includes the 'female-as-caregiver' and 'male-asrightsholder' stereotypes described by Aristotle. 46 In his polis, men were citizens, and therefore rightsholders. A woman's role was to reproduce male citizens, by raising them as well as literally producing them. For Aristotle, this was 'natural.' Rightsholders were male-never pregnant, never breastfeedingand caregivers were female-always subject to the endless demands of caregiving, even if not actually pregnant or breastfeeding.
CEDAW, in contrast, treats this bifurcation as socially constructed. Under CEDAW, reproduction is both supported by the state and disaggregated from women's traditional roles. That is, even as CEDAW protects women's reproductive rights, it situates reproduction in a social and cultural context. 41 . BLANCHFIELD, supra note 7, at art. 1. These measures include the prohibition of  dismissal for pregnancy or maternity leave,48 maternity leave with pay or  "comparable social benefits," 49 and the "necessary supporting social services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through the establishment ... of childcare facilities." 50 Article 12 requires the state to "ensure access to healthcare services, including those related to family planning" and, more specifically, to "ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement in the postnatal period, granting free services when necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation." Article 14 reiterates the right to family planning services for rural women in particular. Finally, Article 16 requires states to "take all appropriate measure to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations."
52
In addition to these specific guarantees, Article 5 more broadly demands recognition of maternity as a "social function."
53 It also requires states to educate men to share in reproductive work:
States shall As noted in a leading human rights text, "the breadth and aspiration of this article can only be described as striking."
See
55 CEDAW recognizes that the sexual division of labor is socially constructed, and that it is neither immutable nor 'natural. ' At the same time, it remains widely internalized and over determined. 56 Article 5 requires states to identify their own cultural "division of tasks by sex" 57 and to eradicate them. 58 The "stereotyped roles" that Article 5 (1974) (noting that "sex roles today are more deeply entrenched than race roles; it is still acceptable, after all, to teach sex roles at home and in school, long after instruction in racial bias has gone underground"). For a compelling study of the ways in which the sexual division of labor is overdetermined in law school, see LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997).
57. CEDAW, supra note 2, at art. 5. It is noteworthy that the U.S. delegate repeatedly stressed that the father's responsibility for childcare be explicit in Article 5. REHOF, supra note 43, at 86-87.
58. In Slovakia, for example, the Committee concluded:
While welcoming measures taken by the State party to eliminate gender segregation in the labour market, including through training programmes in the area of equal opportunities, the Committee is concerned about the persistence of traditional stereotypes regarding the roles and tasks of women and men in the family and in society at large . . . [and] recommends that policies be developed and programmes implemented to ensure the eradication of traditional sex role stereotypes in the family, labour market, the health sector, academia, politics and society at large. . Nigeria reported on six ambitions programs, undertaken to eliminate stereotypes pursuant to Article 5, including a new "National Policy on Education" which is "aimed at encouraging increased participation of the girl child in science and technology" and data indicating that women are "beginning to undertake those vocations which were previously considered masculine such as motor mechanic, welding, commercial drivers and motor-cyclists," as well as efforts to publicize the Child's Rights Act.
CEDAW (such as the refusal to fund elective abortions), 63 whether imposed on all women or a discrete group, whether the objective is to disempower women or to promote women's equality, the denial of women's reproductive rights is barred by CEDAW.6
C. International Equality Jurisprudence
The argument that CEDAW requires the full assurance of women's reproductive rights is further supported by two recent developments in international equality jurisprudence. The first is grounded in rigorous studies documenting women's economic subordination. The second focuses on the burgeoning case law and commentary on same-sex relationships. Both confirm that the sexual division of labor is socially, economically, and legally constructed, and that it can be deconstructed. However entrenched, the sexual division of labor can-and should-be dismantled by law. sphere, associated with reproduction and the raising of children, and in all societies these activities have been treated as inferior." 66 As Marilyn Waring and others show, women's work is economically invisible-it does not appear in national statistics. 67 Women everywhere do all or most of the childcare, they clean and maintain the family home, they prepare the family's food and nurse family members when they become sick. Even when women work outside the home, they continue to perform far more of this work than men. In the United States, for example, Arlie Hochschild and Anne Machung described "the second shift" worked by employed women in the home amounting to an extra month's work each year compared to their husbands. 68 As sociologist Suzanne Bianchi and her colleagues have recently shown, the "second shift" persist twenty years later, albeit in more complicated forms: "Fathers' increased childcare seems to have accelerated particularly in the 1990s ... [but] [m]others still shoulder twice as much childcare and house work." 69 When women work outside of the home, moreover, most work in lowerpaid 'female' occupations, replicating the sexual division of labor within the family. 7 0 Because of the sexual division of labor, women remain relegated to a private sphere of home and family, poverty and powerlessness.
7 ' They perform 66% of the world's work, 72 but they earn only 10% of the world's income, 73 and own merely 1% of the world's property. 74 The sexual division of labor is not the only cause of women's poverty, but it is indisputably a major factor. 75 Thus, the In addition, by impoverishing women, the sexual division of labor impoverishes the families and communities in which they live. Women are less likely to spend money on alcohol or other forms of entertainment for themselves, and more likely to spend it in ways that benefit their children and families. 76 As the World Bank observes, "a host of studies suggest that putting earnings in women's hands is the intelligent thing to do to speed up development and the process of overcoming poverty." 77 Because women tend to reinvest more in their families and communities than men, the entire community benefits when women's poverty is reduced.
Same-Sex Relationships
The second development in international equality jurisprudence which supports the argument against the sexual division of labor is its recent focus on same-sex couples. 78 As Justice Albie Sachs explained in Fourie, extending the benefits of marriage to same-sex partners is fundamentally a matter of equality:
[O]ur Constitution represents a radical rupture with a past based on intolerance and exclusion, and the movement forward to the acceptance of the need to Like racial discrimination, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is grounded in intolerance and exclusion. In validating same-sex marriage, courts and legislatures throughout the world have rejected the notion of a 'natural' sexual division of labor requiring marriage to be restricted to a union between a man and a woman. 80 Rather, there is growing recognition that a state committed to democratic values, especially the equality of its citizens, can no longer endorse laws that discriminate against some of those citizens.
The European Union, with its twenty-seven member states, has been a leader in recognizing the equal rights of same-sex couples. 81 The European
Court of Human Rights, for example, has interpreted the European Convention on Human Rights to require contracting nations to recognize family rights of same-sex couples. 82 The Court relied on Article 14, which provides that the rights set forth in the Convention are to be secured "without discrimination on any ground" to allow the surviving member of a gay couple to remain in his flat. 83 Under the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, similarly, the European Council passed Council Directive 2000/78/EC, which prohibits "any direct or indirect discrimination based on. .. sexual orientation."8 In 2008, the European Court of Justice relied on this Directive to hold that the surviving partner of a German same-sex partner might be able to claim a pension. 85 The Treaty of Lisbon, While welcoming measures taken by the State party to eliminate gender segregation in the labour market, including through training programmes in the area of equal opportunities, the Committee is concerned about the persistence of traditional stereotypes regarding the roles and tasks of women and men in the family and in society at large... [and] recommends that policies be developed and programmes implemented to ensure the eradication of traditional sex role stereotypes in the family, labor market, the health sector, academia, politics and society at large. Same-sex couples in other regions have also drawn on human rights law to challenge discrimination. In South America, for example, same sex-couples have sought assistance from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In The Case of Marta Lucia Alvarez Giraldo, 88 the Commission reviewed a complaint brought by the applicant against Colombia, alleging that the director of the prison in which the applicant was incarcerated had refused her request for intimate visits from her female life partner on the basis of her sexual orientation. Finding that Colombian law afforded prisoners a right to intimate visits, the Commission determined that the applicant had stated a colorable claim of arbitrary and abusive interference with her private life, in violation of Article 11(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights. The resolution recognizes the significance of the adoption of the Yogyakarta Principles and stresses the core principles of universality and non-discrimination in international law. In addition, states "agreed to hold a special meeting 'to discuss the application of the principles and norms' of the inter-American system to abuses based on sexual orientation and gender identity." 9 1
In North America, Canada passed the Civil Marriage Act in 2005 which recognizes same-sex marriage. 92 The United States enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996.93 DOMA defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman, but it does not preclude states from recognizing same-sex marriage under their own laws. Five states currently allow same-sex marriage. Article 23, paragraph 2 of the Covenant is the only substantive provision .. . which defines a right by using the term 'men and women', rather than 'every human being', 'everyone', and 'all persons'. Use of the term 'men and women', rather than the general terms used elsewhere in Part III of the Covenant, has been consistently and uniformly understood as indicating that the treaty obligation of the States parties stemming from article 23, paragraph 2, of the Covenant is to recognize as marriage only the union between a man and woman .... More important, it depends on the ominous usage of two notions. The notion of orientation spans a wide range of personal choices that expand far beyond the individual sexual interest in a copulatory behavior between normal consenting adult human beings, thereby ushering in the social normalization and possibly the legitimization of many deplorable acts, including paedophilia. The second notion is often suggested to attribute particular sexual interests or behaviours to genetic factors, a matter that has repeatedly been scientifically rebuffed. reproductive capacity against the racial or ethnic group of which they are a part, whether the aim is to limit the reproduction of the group or genocide. 1 1 9 A woman has no control over her own capacity to reproduce; rather, that capacity is controlled by the state to reduce or eliminate the racial or ethnic group of which she is a member. This is explicitly recognized in the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 4(d), which defines "imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group" as a form of genocide.1 20 Third, often overlapping but nevertheless distinct, anti-natalist measures may reproduce gender by using women's reproductive capacity against the economic class of which they are a part. This was a major concern during the Cold War. As Goldberg explains, "fears of [a] swelling third world population" was the original impetus for U.S. family planning aid to poor [Blecause of the race-and class-based history of population control and sterilization abuse, women of color have a clearly ambivalent relation to the "abortion rights" platform. For poor women of color, the notion of a "woman's right to choose" to bear children has always been mediated by a coercive, racist state. Chandra Talpade Slave masters' control of Black women's reproduction illustrates better than any other example I know the importance of reproductive liberty to women's equality. Every indignity that comes from the denial of reproductive autonomy can be found in slave women's lives -the harms of treating women's wombs as procreative vessels, of policies that pit a mother's welfare against that of her unborn child, and of government attempts to manipulate women's childbearing decisions through threats and bribes. 21 Reducing the number of poor people, in short was viewed as crucial to the fight against communism. For some women, accordingly, the reproduction of gender has been exacerbated by the reproduction of race and class subordination.
At the other end of the continuum are women who not only have the same legal rights as men, but rights assuring support for reproduction as well. Just as the larger community benefits from reproduction, it shares in its costs.122 Under CEDAW, this is accomplished by assuring women's right to health-and all other rights'23-before, during, and after pregnancy. In addition, as set out in Article 5, men as well as women are responsible for childcare,1 24 and gendered stereotypes are barred. 125 The denial of reproductive rights reproduces gender because it takes control of their own reproductive capacity away from women, relegating them to a sexual division of labor based on biological differences. It puts their bodies at the service of men or the state. If sex equality existed, there would be no more forced sex; safe effective contraception would be available and the psychological pressures surrounding its use would be gone; whatever womanhood meant, women would need neither men nor intercourse nor babies to prove it; abortions for sex-selection as now practiced would be unthinkable; the workplace would be organized with women as much in mind as men; the care of children would be a priority for adults without respect to gender; women would be able to support themselves and their families (in whatever form) in dignity through the work they do. MacKinnon, supra note 112, at 1326-27.
123. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 2, at art. 11.1(f) ("safeguarding of the function of reproduction" in connection with working conditions); id. at art. 11.2(b) (requiring states to "introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits.").
124 125. CEDAW, supra note 2, at art. 5(a) ("To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.").
126. Sometimes bans on abortion and contraception blatantly violate reproductive rights, like the ban in Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu. According to one source, there were "over 10,000 deaths from illegally performed abortions and approximately 5.2 million cases of permanent sterility resulting from faulty . . . procedures." Abrams, supra note 15, at 897. 132. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 n.10 (2d Cir. 1995) (Plaintiffs claimed that defendants encouraged systematic mass rape to further "ethnic cleansing.") The forced impregnation would produce children of their fathers' ethnicity.
As Susan Moller Okin notes, this is not uncommon:
Although the powerful drive to control women-and to blame and punish them for men's difficulty in controlling their own sexual impulses-has been softened considerably in the more progressive reformed versions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, it remains strong in their more orthodox or fundamentalist versions. Moreover, it is by no means confined to Western or monotheistic cultures. Many of the world's traditions and cultures, including those practiced within formerly conquered or colonized nation-states-which
Even if it has a legitimate interest, the state may not violate specific provisions of CEDAW, including the perpetuation of stereotypes barred by Article 5. 134 The state interest may matter under the Civil Covenant or the Economic Covenant, both of which include provisions for derogation. 135 But the Women's Convention, like the Race Convention, which is also aimed at ending discrimination, does not provide for derogation. Whatever the scarcity or emergency, the state cannot rectify it at the expense of the protected group.
13 6
In addition to the violation of specific provisions, the state can deny reproductive rights by any acts or omissions that effectively restrict a woman's choice. 137 This includes the state's failure to enable women to make decisions independently of their husbands, families, and communities. It also includes the failure to provide affordable pre-natal and maternal healthcare and childcare. As Professor Dorothy Roberts observes, this explains the often divergent concerns of American women: "The primary concern of white, middle-class women are laws that restrict choices otherwise available to them, such as statutes that make it more difficult to obtain an abortion. The main concerns of poor women of color, however, are the material conditions of poverty and oppression that restrict their choices." 38 As Professor Roberts and others have shown, in the United States this has a long and ignominious history, beginning in slavery and continuing through the eugenics movement of the early twentieth 136. This is not to say that the rights set out in the Women's Convention are guaranteed regardless of cost. Implementation of the Women's Convention, like that of all human rights treaties, may be constrained by a lack of resources. But a lack of resources does not justify coerced abortion, sterilization, or childbirth. A state might be unable to keep an infant with a severe infirmity alive, for example, but that would not justify forcing the mother to have an abortion. Nor could a state refuse to allow abortions on the basis of cost, since a live birth -and support of the resulting child-would cost even more. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 118, at 241 (noting that "[Ilt is easier for an indigent woman to come up with the money for an abortion than for an indigent family to support a child for years.").
137. See supra Part I. This does not mean that the state has an affirmative obligation to enable "Octomom." Recall the language in the Proclamation of Teheran, supra note 21, referring to the "right to determine freely and responsibly the number and the spacing of their children" (emphasis added).
138. Reproductive rights may be denied by the failure to maintain an environment in which they can be safely and freely exercised, where, for example, men control sex.1 Where such traditions and beliefs conflict with women's reproductive rights, the issue is whether a woman can opt out. This is not an issue where there is no legal capacity. In the case of child marriages, for example, there is no ability to opt out because a child lacks the capacity to consent.1 52 Nor, under CEDAW, do girls have the capacity to consent to female genital surgeries (FGS),153 a range of practices involving total or partial removal of the external female genitalia.' 4 Each year, an estimated two million girls undergo excision. 55 As noted by the non-government organization (NGO) PLAN, FGS is a cultural, rather than a religious practice, most common in sub-Saharan and Northeastern Africa and where immigrants from these areas re-settle. It is viewed as part of a woman's rite of passage into adulthood, and considered a prerequisite to marriage. The purpose of FGS is to reproduce gender in the starkest form. As PLAN observes, "the pain endured is seen as part of the girl's education. It is believed to change her into a respectful, calm, and less demanding person who accepts her role as a servant to her husband."1 56
The CEDAW Committee has carefully set out measures intended to eradicate the practice of FGS without triggering a backlash. 157. General Recommendation No. 14, supra note 154, (recommending that States parties "[tlake appropriate and effective measures with a view to eradicating the practice of female circumcision."); see also, e.g., UNICEF, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION/CUTTING 28-29 (2005), available at http:// www.unicef.org/ publications/files/FGM-C-final_10_October.pdf (noting that prevalence and attitudes are slowly changing in response to culturally-sensitive, country-specific programs).
158.
Female Genital Mutilation, 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2006) (providing in pertinent part; "whoever knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of another person who has not attained the age of 18 years shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both."); see also Op-Ed, Not Anyone's Daughter, N.Y. practice, many have criticized Western condemnation as paternalistic and heavy-handed. 159 This is an instructive reminder that the reproduction of gender is often contested and problematic, and that women themselves are often deeply invested in it. 160 Where the adult woman considers her religion 61 or her cultural community 62 more important than her right to bear a child or to terminate a pregnancy-that is her choice. If a woman chooses not to use birth control in accordance with her religious beliefs, for example, it is not necessarily a denial of reproductive rights. If, however, she is effectively barred from such a decision, it is. In some cases this is clear cut, 163 but in many cases it is not. Many TIMES, July 1, 2010, at A30, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/01/opinion/01thu4.html (urging passage of legislation that would make it a felony to take a girl out of the country to have female genital surgery and suggesting "that ports of entry like Kennedy International Airport in New York City have informational signs, hot lines and a shelter . . . to save a girl from a lifetime of suffering and early death"). (explaining that the Catholic Church's present anti-abortion position "was started by Pope Pius IX in 1854 during his 'affirmation of the immaculate conception of Mary, which elevated the status of women-particularly the "sacredness" of their child-bearing role in church dogma"'); see also id. at 283 ("The influence of the Catholic Church on reproductive rights is international .... The Catholic Church is the only religion with a permanent observer seat in the United Nations .... As an observer, the Holy See sends representatives to the United Nations and to conferences sponsored by the United Nations."). See generally GOLDBERG, supra note 29, at 18 ("The globalized conflicts over women's rights and religious authority that are playing out across the developing world have led to political realignments that complicate the simpler left/right divides of the Cold War years.").
162. Abdullah An Na'im questions whether:
[liberal] theorists ... have a clear understanding of the meaning of cultural membership in a minority culture in Western societies, as a daily existential experience ... [ilf they encourage young women to repudiate the integrity and cohesion of their own minority culture, how can the theorists then help to sustain the identity and human dignity of those women? Abdullah An-na'im, Promises We Should All Keep in Common Cause, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 133, at 59.
163. Where, for example, she faces serious physical sanctions -such as stoning-from which the state either cannot or will not protect her, she has no real choice. If the sanction is moral or social, on the other hand, the question is whether, as a practical matter, women can opt out. As Dixon-Mueller puts it, "Religious values and social norms designed to limit the right to use any or all methods of fertility regulation such as artificial contraception or abortion may be freely accepted by individuals but cannot be imposed on those who choose not to accept such values and norms." DIXON-MUELLER, supra note 28, at 14.
states, for example, allow religious laws, presumably including religious laws regarding reproduction, to govern marriage.
M
The determination whether or not she has a real choice, however difficult, must be considered from the individual woman's perspective. For an outsider to conclude that she suffers from 'false consciousness' 65 assumes a superiority that itself reproduces gender. As Professor Homi Bhabha explains:
[The] norm of Western liberalism becomes at once the measure and mentor of minority cultures-Western liberalism, warts and all, as a salvage operation, if not salvation itself. With a zealousness not unlike the colonial civilizing mission, the 'liberal' agenda is articulated without a shadow of self-doubt, except perhaps an acknowledgment of its contingent failings in the practice of everyday life.1 66 As Katha Politt observes, however: "In its demand for equality for women, feminism sets itself in opposition to virtually every culture on earth. You could say that multiculturalism demands respect for all cultural traditions, while feminism interrogates and challenges all cultural traditions."167 Thus, the question of the individual woman's own choice, from her perspective, must itself be unpacked. Has she had access to education, including the 'family education' required under CEDAW,16 8 so that she is aware of the parameters of that choice? The key to CEDAW's approach to cultural and religious challenges is in Article 10, which requires states to assure women equal "access to studies .. .in educational establishments of all categories in rural as well as urban areas" from pre-school through adulthood.1 69 This includes, it should be recalled, the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of their children.1 70 Article 10 addresses the content of education, requiring the state to "eliminate any stereotyped concept of (1998) (noting that South Africa, India, Egypt, Great Britain, and Israel all allow religious laws to govern marriage). Whether-and when-a-woman can opt out of such marriages poses complicated legal questions, which few women have the resources to resolve. Some of the larger political cultures in which such religious laws are allowed are more supportive than others. See, e.g., Siegel, The De Facto ERA, supra note 10, at 1330 (explaining how "constitutional culture channels social movement conflict").
Cass Sunstein refers to:
internalized norms of subordination. The remedy of "exit"'-the right of women to leave a religious order-is crucial, but it will not be sufficient when girls have been taught in such a way as to be unable to scrutinize the practices with which they have grown up. People's "preferences"-itself an ambiguous term-need not be respected when they are adaptive to unjust background conditions; in such circumstances it is not even clear whether the relevant preferences are authentically "theirs. Volume 18:261 2011 the roles of men and women at all levels and in all forms of education." 17 ' The drafters honed this provision carefully to make it as clear and forceful as possible. The U.S. delegate, supported by the UNESCO observer, suggested that "stress be given to early or career education of children in order to eliminate sexstereotyped roles and images." 7 2 Even if children attend religious schools, or are home-schooled, 7 3 under CEDAW gender equality must be part of the curriculum.
Equally important, a woman cannot freely exercise reproductive rights as a practical matter if she is economically or socially dependent on her cultural community, or if she would not have a place to live or work outside of it. Thus, whether a woman truly enjoys reproductive rights cannot be ascertained without considering whether she can freely exercise other rights. Just as other rights depend upon reproductive rights for their realization, reproductive rights depend upon them.1 74 2. Husbands, Partners, and Parents As noted above, 75 CEDAW breaks new ground in human rights law by explicitly assuring women's rights in the private sphere of the family. CEDAW recognizes that even where reproductive rights are legally assured by the state, as a practical matter they may be denied within the family. A husband or partner can violate a woman's reproductive rights, reproducing gender in the process, in any number of ways, from rape, to physically preventing her from using contraception, 7 6 to forcing her to obtain an abortion by threatening her, to simply shirking childcare responsibilities. A girl's parents, similarly, may prevent her from obtaining family education and access to reproductive health care.'"
The legal effect is the same as if the denial of rights were attributable to the state, and gender is reproduced in the same way. American law addresses this 171. Id. at art. 10(c). This includes "coeducation and other types of education which will help to achieve this aim and, in particular, by the revision of textbooks and school programmes and the adaptation of teaching methods." Id.
172. REHOF by providing for judicial override, at least in the case of abortion.1 78 That is, a girl whose parents will not allow her to obtain an abortion, or who swears that she cannot ask them (because, for example, her father has impregnated her) can nevertheless obtain an abortion with the approval of a judge.1 79 As Professor Martin Guggenheim explains, however, this is usually a partial and inadequate solution.1 80 CEDAW contemplates a more comprehensive approach, but leaves the details of implementation to the states.
III. How THIS PLAYS OUT
International law, for the most part, has been made by men, for menhistorically, politically, structurally, and normatively.1 81 The idea that reproductive rights are women's human rights is very recent. The extent to which states have recognized these rights, albeit rhetorically, is remarkable. That the resultant consensus is not on a par with freedom from torture is not. Nor is the gap between the law as written and the law as applied.
This 181. As a leading human rights text notes, "Of the several blind spots in the early development of the human rights movement, none is as striking as that movement's failure to give violations of women's (human) rights, the attention [and] the priority .. . they require." STEINER ET AL., supra note 55, at 175; see also ERIKSSON, supra note 6, at 3. But see HENKIN ET AL., supra note 135, at 358 (noting that, "international human rights law has, from the outset, applied to men and women equally"). For an account of early efforts to internationalize women's rights, see Fraser, supra note 6, at 878 (describing convention in 1902 in Washington, D.C., which included delegates from the United States, England, Russia, Norway, Germany, Sweden, Turkey, Australia, Chile, and Canada).
182. See CEDAW, supra note 2.
not that was their original intention. 83 In fact, because the denial of these rights perpetuates the core stereotypes that CEDAW was drafted to eradicate, such denial is incompatible with CEDAW's "object and purpose. Reservations, 193 in which it confirms that Articles 2 and 16 of the Convention are "core provisions of the Convention" to which reservations are impermissible. Denial of reproductive rights violates both.
194
As the Statement on Reservations further notes, the CEDAW Committee is "particularly concerned at the number and extent of reservations entered to those articles."
95 Several other state parties to the Convention have objected to these reservations on this ground. 196 These states have not said that they do not consider the reserving party a party to the treaty, which a state may do when it views a reservation as incompatible. Rather, they accept the reserving party as a party to the treaty, presumably for reasons similar to those articulated in the Genocide Case. There, notwithstanding reservations to which some states objected, they recognized the "intention of the General Assembly and of the [ Volume 18: 261 2011 domestic courts generally provides the most effective remedy, where it is available. Some countries, such as the Netherlands, adopt international human rights treaties as domestic law upon ratification. In these states, women would be able to bring suit in their own courts if they were denied their reproductive rights. 199 In some of these states, reproductive rights are already assured under domestic law. In others, however, those seeking to further these rights have successfully drawn on CEDAW. For example, a May 2006 decision by the Constitutional Court of Colombia cited CEDAW when it determined that abortion should not be considered a crime in all circumstances (such as rape, incest, or when the life of the mother is in danger).
200
Since there is no international Supreme Court to resolve conflicting opinions, the interpretations and remedies of the national domestic courts may vary considerably. This 'fragmentation' of international law is a growing concern among international lawyers. As set out in the Report of the International Law Commission on the Fragmentation of International Law ("ILC Report"), international law is losing coherence, certainty, and predictability because it lacks dependable mechanisms for reconciling inconsistencies.
20 1
This fragmentation is exacerbated by the practice of some states, including the United States, which do not always automatically incorporate treaties. Although such states may have ratified the Women's Convention, accordingly, it is not enforceable as domestic law. This means that women in these states cannot claim their rights under CEDAW in their national courts. 202 Nor is there any international tribunal before which women may do so. The ICJ only hears contentious cases between states. 203 While the International Criminal Court ("ICC") has jurisdiction over rape and coerced pregnancy committed "as part of a widespread or systematic attack," this drastically limits the rapes and pregnancies over which it has jurisdiction. While the executive branch was concerned about the international reaction to domestic practices, 2 0 the Senate was more concerned about the domestic reaction to international law-making, as revealed in the debate in the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Genocide Conventions: "If there is to be a succession of treaties from the United Nations dealing with domestic questions, are we ready to surrender the power of the States over such matters to the Federal Government?" 210 Many in Congress were emphatically not "ready to surrender the power of the states over ... to the federal government"-and certainly not to the U.N.
Senator Bricker of Ohio proposed an amendment to the United States Constitution which would require an Act of Congress before any human rights treaty could become law in the United States. 211 The Eisenhower administration was able to defeat the Bricker Amendment, but only by promising not to ratify any human rights treaties. 212 It was not until 1992, after the end of the Cold War, and any possible claim that ratification might give the Soviets an advantage, that the United States finally ratified the Civil Covenant. 213 Even then, it did so with reservations, understandings and declarations ("RUDs") that ensure that the Civil Covenant cannot be relied on in U.S. courts, 214 and that it adds nothing to rights already assured under existing domestic law. 215 As Harold Koh has observed, we remain wary: "In the cathedral of human rights, the United States is more like a flying buttress than a pillar-choosing to stand outside the international structure supporting the international human rights system, but without being willing to subject its own conduct to the scrutiny of that system." CEDAW would establish a comprehensive federal floor for the national assurance of reproductive rights, including education, access to contraception and medical care, and the full panoply of rights set out above. 7 We currently have no national floor because the United States does not recognize affirmative reproductive rights. As noted above, the United States does not even recognize the human right to health. 238 Instead, American women enjoy only the reproductive rights they can afford. As Professor Law points out:
More U.S. women confront unintended pregnancy than women in nearly every other developed country. One reason is that most employment-based health insurance programs in the United States exclude payment for contraceptives from otherwise comprehensive coverage for prescription drugs and medical services. 239 Under CEDAW, all American women would have access to contraception, which would probably limit the need for abortion. Although data indicate that the majority of American women who have had abortions said that they were using contraceptives when they became pregnant, 240 the recent developments of an after-sex pill that can prevent pregnancy if taken within five days of intercourse 24 1 may further reduce the number of abortions sought. 242 The use of teleconferencing to enable women in the first nine weeks of pregnancy to obtain prescriptions for abortion pills, 243 That is, reproductive rights, including the right to contraception and abortion, would no longer be grounded exclusively in Ninth Amendment privacy. Rather, these rights would also be protected by CEDAW's broad and powerful bar on the reproduction of gender.2 51 The privacy rationale for reproductive rights has been criticized since it was articulated. As Professor Linda McClain observes: "[P]rivacy connotes female seclusion and subordination, leading to women's under-participation in society and vulnerability to violence in the home." 252 These concerns are particularly pertinent in the context of reproductive rights. As Justice O'Connor noted in striking Pennsylvania's spousal notification law in Casey:
[T]here are millions of women in this country who are the victims of regular physical and psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands. Should these women become pregnant, they may have very good reasons for not wishing to inform their husbands of their decision to obtain an abortion. Many may have justifiable fears of physical abuse .... Many may fear devastating forms of psychological abuse.
Second, "privacy" is negative; it requires the state to refrain from taking action rather than imposing any affirmative obligations. As Professor Frances Olsen and others note, grounding reproductive rights in privacy, accordingly, undercuts claims for public funding.2 54 Rather, American proponents have long argued that these rights should be grounded in "equality." 255 As Professors Neil
Siegel and Reva Siegel recently discovered, Justice Ginsburg relied on equality while representing a pregnant service woman in 1972. 256 As Professor Anita Allen explains, the equality argument includes two propositions. First, "prohibiting abortion is a form of prima facie or de jure sex discrimination," and, second, it "results from constitutionally unacceptable stereotypes." 257 Both
propositions, as explained above, are encompassed by CEDAW.
But there are problems with equality under Constitutional doctrine. As Professor Law notes: "[T]he development of modem constitutional sex equality doctrine has suffered from a lack of focus on biological reproductive differences between men and women."25s 8 In addition, sex-based classifications are only viewed as 'quasi-suspect' by the Supreme Court. 259 Unlike race, they do not trigger strict scrutiny. As Professor Suzanne Goldberg has shown, this has produced a hopelessly convoluted jurisprudence. 260 Like privacy doctrine, moreover, equal protection imposes no affirmative obligations on the state.
explicitly recognizes the social importance of reproduction, that is, the importance of reproduction to the larger community. Thus, under CEDAW, those claiming reproductive rights are not "left alone" in the private sphere, 269 but welcomed into the public sphere with appropriate accommodations for workers, including pregnant or nursing workers, and their children. CEDAW further recognizes the obligation of the larger community to provide actual material support before, during, and after birth. As Professor Law explains, this is crucial to women's equality. She understands, as did the CEDAW framers, that gender equality requires "transformation of the family, child-bearing arrangements, the economy, the wage/labor market, and human consciousness."
270
There is an additional issue. The abortion cases also recognize the "State's interest in potential life." 2 7 ' Ninth Amendment privacy does not outweigh this interest as long as the state statute or regulation does not place "a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion."
272 Under international human rights law, the state interest in "potential life" would probably not outweigh CEDAW-strength equality. As Professor Philip Alston has explained, a fetus is not considered a "person" under international law. 273 As Professor Balkin notes, many American jurists have reached a similar conclusion. 274 product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency."). But see MacKinnon, supra note 112, at 1320 (arguing that "only women can be disadvantaged, for a reason specific to sex, through state-mandated restrictions on abortion. The denial of funding for Medicaid abortions obviously violates this right. The Medicaid issue connects the maternity historically forced on African American women integral to their exploitation under slavery with the motherhood effectively forced on poor women, many of whom are Black, by deprivation of government funding for abortions. For those who have not noticed, the abortion right has already been lost: this was when.").
269. 
CONCLUSION
This Article has explained how CEDAW bars the reproduction of gender, and why that requires nothing less than the full assurance of women's reproductive rights. It has explained how earlier human rights law recognized women's reproductive rights, and how that law fell short. CEDAW goes beyond mere non-discrimination to assure equality on steroids; it situates reproductive rights in the public sphere, and requires states-as well as nonstate actors-to respect, protect, and fulfill them. CEDAW challenges, and firmly rejects, the sexual division of labor in its endless cultural variations.
Part I drew on decades of rigorous empirical work to show the depths of women's poverty and how, exactly, that poverty is grounded in the sexual division of labor. This Part concluded by describing the trend in international equality jurisprudence toward recognition of same-sex relationships. Like CEDAW's bar on the reproduction of gender, this jurisprudence exposes the sexual division of labor as a human construct, which can and should be repudiated.
Part II showed how the denial of women's reproductive rights specifically reproduces gender. It takes control of their own reproductive capacity away from women, relegating them to a sexual division of labor based on biological differences. It puts their bodies at the service of men or the state. The denial of reproductive rights reproduces gender whether by a state or a non-state party, whether by explicit prohibitions or by the failure to provide necessary services, including childcare.
Part III explained how this plays out, internationally and in the United States. Part III first drew on recent work on the fragmentation of international law to describe the proliferation of national applications. It concluded by situating this law in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, showing how the arguments set out in this Article resonate with the arguments of Justice Ginsburg, and Professors Law, Siegel and others, to ground reproductive rights in equality, rather than privacy. Efforts to do so under the U.S. Constitution have failed. As this Article demonstrates, CEDAW's broad and powerful bar on the reproduction of gender is stronger than equal protection. It can do the work necessary to assure reproductive rights, the bedrock of women's equality.
